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Internet auctions have become increasingly popular in the 21
st
 century. However, 
asymmetric information induced issues, such as the inability to trust the seller and 
product quality uncertainty, might discourage the buyers' willingness to bid according to 
their true valuations. In order to alleviate trust issues, sellers are able to build an online 
reputation through successful online transactions. The purpose of this Master's thesis is 
to explore the impact of seller's reputation and chosen promotion methods on auction 
outcomes in Finnish Huuto.net online auction website. 
 
The fundamental concepts of auction theory, such as valuation models, the basic four 
auction types, the revenue equivalence theorem and optimal auctions are introduced. 
Signaling theory is discussed in addition to the bidding mechanisms and reputation 
systems of internet auctions. The recent literature considering the impact of a seller's 
reputation and promotion methods on auction outcomes is reviewed. The hypotheses set 
to be tested are derived from the recent empirical studies and auction theory. The 
statistical method used in the tests of hypotheses is multiple linear regression analysis. 
The dataset analyzed in this study consists of 227 auctions of iPhone 4S 16 GB mobile 
phones posted up for auction by 138 individual sellers. 
 
The main finding of this study is that the sellers who have acquired a costless 
identification from Huuto.net achieve a hefty increase in the final sales price. It also 
turns out that sellers who have not established an online reputation experience a steep 
decline in the realized closing price of the auction. The impact of negative feedback is 
significant as well; the increase of negative feedback points decreases the final sales 
price. Purchasing display-enhancing promotional options does not increase the price or 
probability of sale. In short, establishing reputation, avoiding negative feedback and 
acquiring identification pays off. The promotional options are not worth the cost. 
 










Internet auctions have gained more and more popularity since the mid-nineties, when 
the first websites started offering auction services to consumers. EBay, which is the 
biggest online auction and operates in several countries, had 94 million active users 
worldwide in 2010. Most internet auctions operate without the strict restrictions of time 
and place typical to conventional auctions. Consumers can take part to an internet 
auction virtually from any place that has internet available. Now it is even possible to 
participate to bidding or pay one's items using a cellphone which has wireless internet. 
Bidding and browsing through a vast amount of items is considered a fun way to spend 
time. Although internet auction sites lure more and more normal consumers to sell and 
buy items, the amount of consumers who have become professional sellers and set up 
their own "stores" in the auction community, is growing (Lin, Li, Janamanchi & Huang 
2006). The market created by eBay is expanding internationally, and its growth is rapid. 
(Lucking-Reiley 2000b: 227-229; eBay Inc. 2011d: 2-3) 
1.1. Research problem 
The trustworthiness of a seller plays a significant role in online auctions. The problem 
of asymmetric information is strongly present in online auctions. The typical problem 
for a buyer is that he cannot inspect the item beforehand, so he must decide whether to 
trust the seller's product description or not. The seller has also the possibility to conduct 
other fraudulent actions, such as not sending the item and pocketing the money or 
faking reputation scores by submitting them with pseudonyms created by the seller 
(Livingston 2005: 453). Online auctions have come up with reputation systems to 
alleviate these problems and to reward sellers with an excellent reputation thus 
encouraging other sellers to act honestly as well. The question is, does a seller with high 
reputation achieve higher prices compared to sellers with low reputation? Does it pay to 
build a good reputation? 
 
In order to achieve more visibility and credibility for their products, sellers are able to 
purchase listing upgrades and add pictures to their sales announcement. Upgrades and 
other additional features are often costly and purchasing them is not always necessary. 
A seller can also provide additional information and acquire warranties or certificates in 
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order to signal the high quality of the product. Is it worthwhile for the seller to purchase 
costly listing upgrades or provide additional information in order to achieve a higher 
price? Are auction sites just collecting extra fees by selling listing upgrades to 
inexperienced sellers, or do these promotion methods pay? 
 
The objective of the thesis is to find out whether certain measurable factors of seller's 
reputation and used promotional methods impact on the closing price and probability of 
sale in the biggest Finnish online auction Huuto.net. The crucial distinctive feature in 
the auctions of Huuto.net is the possibility for sellers to identify themselves using online 
bank verification service. This divides sellers to two groups as identified sellers are 
tagged with a thumbs-up figure next to their pseudonym. The hypotheses set in this 
study are based on previous studies considering the effects of seller's reputation and 
auction theory. 
1.2. The structure of the thesis 
To understand the empirical results of seller's reputation and promotion methods better, 
one should know a little auction theory. This Master's thesis begins by introducing the 
reader to the basic concepts of conventional auctions. For example, the basic four types 
of auctions, information asymmetry, the revenue equivalence theorem and optimal 
auctions are addressed. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
introduces the reader to the literature of auction theory. Section 3 covers the bidding 
mechanisms and reputation systems of eBay and Huuto.net. Signaling theory and the 
effects of seller's reputation and promotion methods are addressed as well. The 
hypotheses for empirical research are set in section 3. Section 4 discusses the properties 
of the dataset. Tests of hypotheses and results of the research are presented in section 5. 
Section 6 discusses the findings and concludes the thesis. 
1.3. The main findings and contribution 
The empirical investigation reveals that reputation matters in online commerce. First, 
the increase of seller’s negative feedback points decreases the final price of the auction 
as presumed on the basis of recent literature. On the other hand, the increase of positive 
or neutral feedback points do not affect notably to the final price or probability of sale. 
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Second, sellers with no established reputation experience a radical decline in closing 
price compared to sellers with more or equal than one trade. The decline in the final 
price may be a result of the buyers’ lack of trust or the seller’s inexperience. Whatever 
the reason, results strongly suggest building a reputation in order to achieve a decent 
price for one’s iPhone. The third and the main finding of this thesis as well is the price 
premium achieved by identified sellers. Identification is acquired via online bank 
verification and it guarantees that a certain seller's pseudonym can be linked to a real 
person. In order to improve the buyer safety of e-commerce, Huuto.net courage traders 
to acquire identification as the service is free of charge. The results clearly show that 
buyers put a lot of weight to the fact whether the seller has identified herself or not.  
 
It is also found that the use of promotional upgrades, which either enhance the visual 
look of one’s listing or increase the visibility of the listing, are not worth the cost. These 
promotional upgrades do not have a significant effect to the closing price or probability 
of the auction. Hence, at least in the auctions of iPhone 4S 16 GB mobile phones, the 
use of these costly promotional vehicles is not justified. In addition, the use promotional 
options, excluding the listing picture, was extremely scarce. This suggests that 
Huuto.net should consider making radical changes to its assortment of promotional 
upgrades if they ever want to make serious profit from the sales of effective promotional 
tools for e-commerce sellers. 
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2. AUCTION THEORY 
 
 
Auction is defined as a market institution with an explicit set of rules determining 
resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids of market participants (McAfee & 
McMillian 1987: 701). The participants of auction may vary between governments, 
privately owned businesses and consumers. The price of a product is the main 
communicator of information in the markets, the vector of prices is all that a consumer 
needs to know to make a decision. A seller might have difficulties in determining the 
best price for an item if it does not have a standard value. Artwork, books, antique, 
agricultural produce and postage stamps are traditional examples of items which are 
usually sold in auctions (McAfee & McMillan 1987). Collectibles still form the biggest 
group of items sold in internet auctions, consumer electronics being the second biggest 
group (Lucking-Reiley 2000b: 231-232). 
2.1. Asymmetry of information 
The ultimate reason for arranging an auction is the information asymmetry in the 
market. Someone of the participants always lacks or possesses crucial information 
related to the transaction. The valuations (how much one is willing to pay for the item) 
of bidders are unknown to the seller. This prevents the seller from simply posting a 
fixed price. In this case the seller's ability to gain surplus is limited. Auctions being 
games of incomplete information, the valuations of other bidders are unknown not only 
to the seller, but to an individual bidder as well (Phlips: 1988: 93-94). Different models 
of bidders' valuations are discussed in the following chapters. (McAfee & McMillan 
1987: 703-704) 
 
The seller's ability to commitment and thus not reneging from the transaction after 
receiving the bids is vital in order to induce the bidders to bid by their true valuations 
(McAfee & McMillan 1987: 703-704). Other problem induced by asymmetry of 
information was described by Akerlof (1970) as the "lemons" problem. Dishonest 
sellers of used cars may take advantage of the buyers' insufficient information of 
automobiles and, therefore, sell a car that turns out to be "a lemon". A lemon is a slang 
term for a car which later on turns out to be in poor condition when compared to the 
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price paid. In the worst case scenario, dishonest sellers could drive the honest sellers out 
of the market if the information asymmetry problem is not dealt with. 
2.2. Valuation models 
Bidders have no perfect information about the true valuations of other bidders, due to 
the asymmetry of information. Each bidder's valuation is based on a certain value which 
is drawn from a probability distribution. How each bidding situation is modeled, is 
dependent of the alternate assumptions of probability distributions. The independent-
private-values (IPV) model and the common value model are polar cases and meant to 
ease the study of auctions. The general model, however, is more close to a real-world 
situation in auctions. (McAfee & McMillan 1987: 703-705) 
2.2.1 The independent-private-values model 
In the IPV model, each bidder knows exactly how much he values the item. He does not 
know the valuations of other bidders, and the possible information available does not 
affect his valuation. The valuation of a certain art-collecting bidder reflects his intrinsic 
taste. For example, the value of a painting in an art auction depends of every bidder's 
own personal taste. Bidder i (i = 1, . . . , n) draws his valuation vi from a probability 
distribution Fi, which is individual for each bidder. The valuation vi of every bidder is 
therefore statistically independent. (Lipczynski, Wilson & Goddard 2009: 357; McAfee 
& McMillan 1987: 704-705) 
2.2.2 The pure common value model 
Consider an incident where art dealers are bidding against each other for a single work 
of art such as a painting. After the auction, their intention is to resell the painting. The 
work of art has a certain unobservable true value V in the aftermarket, but no one knows 
exactly what this value is. The best guess of dealer i (i = 1, . . .  , n) of the painting's 
value is his valuation vi which is drawn from a common distribution H(vi|V). The 
distribution H is known by all agents. In this model as well the bidders' valuations are 
static. If a bidder had access to the valuation of a rival bidder, it would have no effect to 
the bidder's valuation. (McAfee & McMillan 1987: 705) 
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2.2.3 The general model 
The general model, which is also known as the affiliated valuations model, is closer to 
the settings of a real-world situation as it contains properties of both the IPV and 
common value models. In this case, each bidder i possesses some information of the 
item up for auction. The components of vector X (X = X1, . . . , Xn) represent the real-
valued value estimates (information variables or signals) of the individual bidders. The 
components of vector S (S = S1, . . . , Sm) are additional real-valued information signals 
which influence the value of the item to the bidders. Some of the components of vector 
S might be observable by the seller, but not observable by the bidder. Hence, the actual 
valuation of the item is denoted Vi = ui(S,X). The general model allows the bidders' 
valuations to be affiliated: the valuations (and information signals from other sources) 
of other bidders impact on the valuation of bidder i. For example, in an art auction some 
of the components might represent the evaluations of art connoisseurs and appraisals 
obtained by the seller. (Milgrom & Weber 1982: 1097) 
2.3. The standard auction types 
This section addresses the following four standard types of auctions: 
 
1. The English auction  
2. The Dutch auction 
3. The First-price sealed-bid auction 
4. The Second-price sealed-bid auction 
 
There is also a wide variety of auctions that have distinctive properties such as the sale 
of various items at the same time. These multiunit auctions and other mixed-type 
auctions are not addressed in this Master's thesis. (Klemperer 1999: 229) 
2.3.1 The English auction 
The English auction (also known as oral, ascending-bid or open auction) is usually the 
most known format of auctions and is most often used for selling goods. The price is 
raised by calling prices either by bidders or an auctioneer until only one bidder remains. 
He is called the high bidder. The high bidder pays the price equivalent to his bid. The 
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auction is open in a way that all the other bidders know the best bid throughout the 
auction. English auctions often last for seconds to minutes and they are commonly used 
to sell antique and artwork. (McAfee & McMillan 1987; Lucking-Reiley 2000b) 
2.3.2 The Dutch auction 
The Dutch auction or the descending-bid auction resembles English auction in a 
reversed manner. The auctioneer starts with a certain price and then lowers it 
incrementally. Nowadays there is no auctioneer; an electronic board displays the 
incrementally declining price. Participants of the auction are handed an electronic 
device to elicit bids. The first bidder to react wins the auction. Dutch auctions have been 
used traditionally in the sales of Dutch flowers and are considered as a very fast auction 
type. The average duration for a typical auction is four seconds. (McAfee & McMillan 
1987: 702; Carare & Rothkopf 2005: 365) 
2.3.3 The first-price and second-price sealed bid auction 
In both first-price and second-price sealed bid auction the bidders submit only one bid 
without knowing the bids of rival bidders. There is no possibility to revise one's bid. In 
the first-price sealed bid auction, the winning bidder pays the amount of his bid, and in 
turn the winner of a second-price sealed bid auction pays the amount of the second-
highest bid. (McAfee & McMillan 1987: 702) 
 
First-price sealed bid auctions are used in the auctioning of mineral rights to U.S 
government-owned land and sometimes in the sales of artwork and real estate (McAfee 
& McMillan 1987: 702). Since the late 19
th
 century, second-price sealed bid auctions, 
sometimes called Vickrey auctions, according to the author of a seminal paper on 
auction theory (Vickrey 1961), have been used in the sales of collectible postage 
stamps. Auctioneers usually published a catalog or a newspaper advertisement of 
stamps up for auction. If the auction was held in a small town, the format of the auction 
would have been a second-price sealed bid auction, which enabled collectors to 
participate by mail. Collectors usually sent a letter to the auctioneer, so their rivals 




2.4. The Revenue Equivalence Theorem 
The revenue equivalence theorem is considered as the fundamental attainment of 
auction theory (see Klemperer 1999; McAfee & McMillan 1987; Milgrom & Weber 
1982; Phlips 1988; Riley 1989; Vickrey 1961). Its applications are crucial when 
designing optimal auctions, which are used to maximize seller revenue. The revenue 
equivalence theorem establishes conditions under which all of the basic four auction 
types yield on average the same amount of revenue for the seller:  
 
1. The bidders are risk neutral. 
2. The independent private-values assumption applies. 
3. The bidders are symmetric. 
4. Payment is a function of bids alone. 
 
While these assumptions apply, a seller who is finding a way to maximize his profits 
from an auction is indifferent to which basic auction type he chooses. At first glance, 
this may seem hard to believe, but the reason lies in the different behaviors of bidders in 
different bidding situations. (McAfee & McMillan 1987:706-707) 
 
In the English auction, the second last bidder drops out as soon as the price exceeds his 
valuation of the item. The bidder who has the highest valuation wins the auction and 
pays a price equal to the second highest bidder's valuation. The price paid is usually 
below the valuation of the high-bidder. Therefore, he gains some economic rent of v(1) - 
v(2). The rent is only known by the winning bidder because only he knows his own 
valuation. The n bidders' valuations are v(1) , . . . , v(n). Suppose v(1) is the highest 
valuation, (the first order statistic) and v(2) is the second highest valuation (the second 
order statistic). Because of the IPV assumption, the other bidders' valuations are 
independently drawn from a probability distribution F. Hence the expected economic 
rent of the winning bidder is the expected difference between the first order statistic v(1) 
and the second order statistic v(2). On the basis of above argue McAfee and McMillan 
(1987) establish the expected payment received by the seller in an English auction 
which is defined 
(1)  ( ( ))   ( )   
   ( ( ))




The seller does not know the winning bidders valuation of v(1), but the expected value of 
J(v(1)) is not a function of v(1). The winning bidder's expected payment is increasing in 
his own valuation: It will be assumed throughout that the distribution F is such that J is 
a strictly increasing function. (McAfee and McMillan 1987: 707-708) 
 
In the English auction, the bidder's dominant strategy is to stay in the bidding game 
until her valuation is exceeded. In the second-price sealed-bid auction, the dominant 
strategy is to submit one bid, which is equal to the true valuation of the bidder. This is 
called dominant equilibria. The bidders bid by their true valuations regardless of other 
bidders' expected valuations. Now the bidder in the second-price sealed-bid auction 
does not know the bids of other bidders, so the amount he pays if he wins depends of 
the valuation of the second-highest bidder. What if bidder i lowered his bid and would 
not bid by his true valuation? The lowering of the bid would only have effect to the 
outcome of the auction if a rival bidder's bid turned out as the highest bid. Hence, bidder 
i would lose the item. If bidder i increased his bid above his valuation, it would have an 
effect to the outcome of the auction in only one case. If a rival bidder's bid was higher 
than the true valuation of bidder i, but lower than the increased bid of bidder i, as a 
result, bidder i would have to pay more of the item than it is worth to him. This means 
that in the second-price sealed-bid auction, as in the English auction also, the winning 
bidder pays the amount equal to the second-highest bidder's valuation. Thus, the 
expected payment in both auction types is the expected value of J(v(1)). (McAfee & 
McMillan 1987: 708) 
 
The optimal bidding strategy in the first-price sealed-bid auction is to submit the bid 
some distance below one's true valuation. The expected price for the seller is the highest 
private value minus the amount by which this bidder shades his bid. In the Dutch 
auction, the optimal bidding strategy is to submit the bid when the price has fallen some 
distance below the bidder's valuation. The seller's expected price turns out to be the 
expected value of the highest private valuation minus the further amount which the 
bidder allows the price to drop before submitting the bid. Therefore, in both Dutch and 
first-price sealed bid auction the seller's expected price turns out to be the expectation of 
the second-highest private value. (Lipczynski et al. 2009: 366) 
 
The Dutch and first-price sealed-bid auction do not have a dominant equilibrium. 
Instead, the equilibrium satisfies the weaker criterion of Nash equilibrium. Bidder i 
whose valuation is vi, predicts that any other bidder j will bid an amount of B(vj) if his 
valuation is vj. The valuations of other bidders are, of course, unknown to the bidder i. If 
18 
 
he submits bid bi and wins the auction, he earns a surplus of vi - bi. The bidder's optimal 
strategy is to submit a bid which is his own valuation minus how much he shades his 
bid, which is shown on the right hand side of the equation. At Nash equilibrium, 





The bidder with the highest valuation v(1) wins the auction. The seller is unaware of the 
winner's valuation v(1), thus the expected selling price is the expected value of B(v(1)), 
which is equal to the expected value of J(v(1)) defined earlier. (McAfee & McMillan 
1987: 708-710) 
 
To summarize the revenue equivalence theorem, the following conclusions can be 
made. Note that these conclusions hold only while the previously presented four 
assumptions apply. The English auction and second-prize sealed-bid auction are 
equivalent. In both auction types, the item ends up to the bidder who values it the most, 
but he pays a price equal to the second-highest valuation. The dominant strategy in the 
English auction is to stay in the bidding game until one's valuation is exceeded. In the 
second-price auction, the dominant strategy is to submit a bid which is the bidder's own 
true valuation. The Dutch auction and first-price sealed-bid auction are strategically 
equivalent. The winner of the auction is the bidder with the highest independent-private-
valuation. At the dominant-strategy equilibrium, the outcome of English and second-
price auctions is Pareto optimal. In symmetric models, the Dutch and first-price 
auctions lead to Pareto optimal allocations, as well. The seller's expected profit is 
identical from all of the four basic auction types. (Milgrom & Weber 1982: 1090-1093) 
2.5. Optimal auctions 
The revenue equivalence theorem states that all of the four basic auction types produce 
the same amount of revenue to the seller. However, the seller has the power to 
arbitrarily modify the rules of the auction in order to maximize his profit. Further, when 
relaxing a single assumption at a time of the four assumptions which were previously 
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presented, the bidders' behavior in a certain auction situation changes, which as well 
enables the seller to design or choose the optimal auction for that situation. For an 
example of how to successfully design an optimal auction in the real-world settings, see 
the papers of Klemperer (2002a; 2002b). 
2.5.1 Risk aversion 
The term risk-neutral means that from the bidders' point of view, the outcomes of the 
auction are binary. Either the bidder wins the auction and gains some rent or fails to bid 
victoriously in the auction and therefore loses or gains nothing (Lipczynski, Wilson & 
Goddard 2009: 369). We now relax the assumption of risk neutrality while keeping the 
other three assumptions intact. In the English auction or second-price sealed-bid 
auction, risk-aversion does not effect to the bidder's optimal strategy which is to submit 
a bid equal to her own valuation. However in the Dutch or second-price sealed-bid 
auction, risk-aversive bidders can increase their bid in order to improve the possibility 
of winning at the cost of slightly reducing the value of winning. Hence, risk-aversive 
bidders bid more aggressively than risk-neutral bidders in Dutch and second-price 
sealed-bid auctions. For a risk-neutral seller who is finding a way to maximize his 
profits and is facing risk-aversive buyers while other assumptions apply, the solution is 
to arrange Dutch or second-price sealed-bid auction. (Klemperer 1999: 234) 
2.5.2 Affiliation and the winner's curse 
In the preceding argument, the valuations of bidders' have been strictly considered as 
their private information. Thus, it is independent of their competitors' information. 
When bidders' valuations have properties of both common value and independent-
private-values model, their valuations are affiliated. In this general model, the 
awareness of one bidder's high valuation increases the possibility of other bidders to 
perceive the value of the item high as well. Of the four basic auction types, only in the 
English auction it is possible for the participating bidders to observe each other's bids. 
Thus, only the English auction conveys information among bidders. When the IPV 
assumption applies, the bidders submit bids by their own solid and independent 
valuations. When the IPV assumption is relaxed while keeping the remaining three as 
they were and taking into consideration the fact that English auction has the feature of 
making other bidders private information public, the English auction yields higher 




The pure common valuations of the bidders' are in a strong relationship with a 
phenomenon called the winner's curse. When the price of the item of the auction is only 
the best guess of participating bidders, there is a great opportunity to overestimate the 
value. Therefore, the winner of the auction may turn out to be the loser as he realizes the 
true value of the item (McAfee & McMillan 1987:720-721). The classic case of 
winner's curse is the auctions of oil drilling rights in the Gulf of Mexico. The oil firms 
have overestimated the value of oil and gas in the area, which has effected greatly to 
their ability of gaining adequate return to their investments. (Lipczynski et al. 2009: 
358-359) 
 
The seller has a few ways to alleviate the problem of winner's curse. At the same time it 
is possible for the seller to increase his profits. By giving out any information relating to 
the true value of the item, the seller can increase the low valuations of some bidders and 
cause them to bid more aggressively. In the English, second-price and first-price 
auctions the best policy for a seller is to honestly report all information available to the 
bidders, in order to maximize the expected price (Milgrom & Weber 1982: 1095-1096; 
McAfee & McMillan: 722). For the seller, the other way to increase his profits and 
alleviate the consequences of winner's curse is to specify a reserve price. The optimal 
reserve price varies according to the auction type. Unless the final price is equal or 
exceeds the reserve price, the item is not sold. The seller should set the reserve price 
(denoted r) always higher than his own valuation v0 (r > v0). The winner's valuation is 
denoted v1. Consider the following simplified cases (the valuations of bidders and the 
seller are uniformly distributed on a probability distribution F) of reserve price in an 
English auction. If r > v1 > v0, the seller retains the item even though the winner values 
the item more than the seller. If v1 > r > v0, the item is won by the bidder with the 
highest valuation and the seller gains a positive rent of r - v0. Setting a reserve price 
prevents the seller from giving away his item, if his valuation is not exceeded. In 
English and second-price sealed bid auction, the amount which the winner pays is equal 
to the second-highest valuation v2. Even if the winner's valuation is higher than seller's 
valuation (v1 > v0) the second-highest valuation can be lower than seller's (v0 > v2). 
Therefore the seller might have to hand over the item for a price that is lower than his 
valuation, because of v1 > v0 > v2. In the Dutch or first-price sealed-bid auction, if v1 > 
v0 > v2, the winning bidder might shade his valuation v1 in a way that the winning bid is 
lower than seller's valuation of v0. (Lipczynski et al. 2009: 368-369) 
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2.5.3 Asymmetric bidders 
In the case of asymmetric bidders, the valuations of bidders are drawn from different 
probability distributions. For example, in an artwork auction the collectors' and 
resellers' valuations are based on different probability distributions F1 and F2, 
respectively. The English auction operates efficiently in spite of the assumption of 
asymmetric bidders. The price rises until it reaches the second-highest valuation. 
However, the first-price sealed-bid auction is not as efficient. The two types of bidders 
face different kind of bidding competition. Hence, according to the bidding function of 
type 1 bidder, which is described by the equation (2) above, the gap between a type 1 
bidder's valuation and the second highest valuation is different compared to the gap of 
type 2 bidder with the same valuation. (McAfee & McMillan 1987: 715) 
2.5.4 Royalties 
In the previous chapters the seller's payment has been dependent of the bids alone. 
When the assumption "payment is a function of bids alone" is relaxed while the 
remaining three are maintained, the seller is able to require royalties or incentive 
payments after the auction. The reason for imposing a royalty is its sole function of 
transferring rents from the winning bidder to the seller. For example, in the auctions of 
oil drilling rights to government-owned land the payment consists of the winning bid 
and a royalty based on the amount of oil extracted. In the case of royalties, the payment 
p to the seller by the winning bidder is a linear function: 
(3)       ̃, 
where b is the bid,  r is the royalty rate and variable  ̃ the seller's ex post estimate of the 
winning bidder's true valuation v. Now, the seller has three different bidding 
mechanisms to choose from.  
 
A) The seller can call for bids b and set the royalty rate r. 
B) The seller can set the fixed payment b and call for bids on the royalty rate r. 
C) The seller can call the bids on both the fixed payment b and the royalty rate r 
at the same time. 
 
Consider the seller prefers option A more than the two rival bidding mechanisms. The 
seller's expected revenue is an increasing function of the royalty rate, if the distribution 
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of the variable  ̃ is exogenous. The increase of the royalty rate induces the bidders to 
bid more aggressively thus increasing the seller's expected revenue. The reason for the 
seller not ordering a 100 percent royalty is the problem of moral hazard. The increase of 
royalty rate diminishes the gained rent of the winning bidder after the auction, thus the 





3. INTERNET AUCTIONS 
 
 
EBay is the biggest consumer to consumer (C2C) online auction site there is, and it also 
offers a wide variety of other selling methods for consumers. Almost a decade ago 
Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) referred to eBay as "the web behemoth". Since then, eBay 
has only grown. By the end of year 2010, eBay had 94 million active users, its net 
revenues were $9.2 billion, and its operating margin was 22 percent. It has grown 
internationally and found country-specific marketplaces, for example in Germany and 
the United Kingdom. A hefty 47 percent of its net revenues come from international 
markets. It has expanded to mobile platforms and has found it extremely profitable: in 
the end of 2010 the mobile volume of eBay was astonishing $2 billion with over 30 
million downloads of its mobile app. The net total payment volume of Paypal, a money 
transfer company owned by eBay, was $92 billion. With an astonishing number of items 
up for auction, eBay is a marketplace for nearly everything one can sell. In contrast to 
the huge web behemoth eBay, Huuto.net is a small national web auction provider. It is, 
however, the number one auction site in Finland, gaining over 600 000 individual 
visitors a week. (eBay Inc. 2011d: 2-3; Sanoma Oyj 2011: 30) 
 
This chapter addresses the reputation system and bidding mechanism of both eBay and 
Huuto.net. In addition to their difference in size and the fact that eBay is an 
international web giant and Huuto.net a Finnish auction provider owned by a traditional 
newspaper company, the most striking difference between these two online auction 
providers is the auction type. The auction format of Huuto.net is the simple English 
auction with a proxy bidding mechanism. The auction type of eBay corresponds to the 
properties of second-price sealed-bid auction with a proxy bidding mechanism. 
3.1. Bidding in eBay and Huuto.net 
The auction type of eBay resembles the second-price auction. The bidding mechanism 
of eBay is called "proxy bidding". The concept of proxy bidding is simple: Bidder A 
only has to submit the maximum amount of money (in auction theory terms, his 
valuation) he is willing to pay for the item. Suppose the minimum bid set by the seller 
of an item is $9, the bid increment is $.50 and bidder A's maximum submitted bid $30. 
The proxy bidding mechanism automatically sets the high bid to $9. If bidder B enters 
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the auction with a proxy bid of $14, the mechanism raises bidder A's bid to $14.50. If 
bidder C entered the auction with a maximum bid of $30.50, bidder A is no longer the 
high bidder and is noted by an e-mail. After this, bidder A is able to submit a new 
maximum bid or accept his loss. The item ends up to the bidder with the highest bid, 
and he pays the amount of second-highest bid plus one bid increment. (Bajari & 
Hortaçsu: 2003: 330)  
 
The auction type of Huuto.net is the English auction with a five-minute extension 
period and a proxy bidding mechanism (Puhakainen, Tuunainen & Rossi 2004). In 
internet auctions sellers usually set the closing price of the auction in advance. The 
fixed ending time does not bring any benefits to an early bidder. An early bid only 
reveals information to the rivals of the early bidder. This encourages buyers to bid just 
seconds before the auction ends. This is called sniping. If all bidders acted this way, 
there would be no possibility of seeing each bidder's bids and reacting to them. This 
way the English auction becomes more like first-price, sealed bid auction. Internet 
auction providers have come up with two different solutions to restore the English 
auction properties. Some auction sites offer an extension period. If someone bids in the 
last five minutes before the closing time, the auction automatically receives a five 
minute increase to its closing time, leaving time for other bidders to react. The 
disadvantage of the extension period is that it removes the asynchronous nature of the 
auction. This means that one must be present and observe the auction in case someone 
submits a higher bid. eBay alleviates the problem of sniping by implementing a proxy 
bidding mechanism. The bidder is able to submit his highest bid, and the online auction 
system takes care of the bidding to the maximum bid submitted. (Lucking-Reiley 
2000b: 238-239) 
 
Bajari & Hortaçsu (2003) model eBay auctions as a second-price sealed-bid auction. 
Assume there are N potential bidders viewing each listing. Each bidder has to bear a bid 
preparation cost c; therefore, not every bidder enters the auction. In eBay auctions, c 
represents the cost of estimating the value of the coin and the opportunity cost of time 
spent bidding. After paying the bid preparation cost c, each bidder receives his private 
signal xi from the common distribution of item v. In equilibrium, each bidder enters the 
auction if his ex ante expected profit is greater than zero. All bidders have the same 
entry probability p. When there are n bidders known to take part in the auction, a 
bidder's ex ante expected profit is equal to (Vn-Wn)/n-c, where Vn is the ex ante expected 
value of the item, Wn is the ex ante expected payment of the winning bidder to the 
seller. It is possible for the seller to set a minimum bid denoted r. The probability of 
25 
 
trade given n and a minimum bid r is defined Tn(r). The probability of that there are n 
bidders in the auction, conditional on the entry by bidder i is defined p
i
n. On the basis of 
the previous argument, bidders' participation to a certain auction can be understood by 
the following zero-profit condition which will hold in equilibrium. 
 
(4)   ∑   
   ( )
(     )
 
 
   , 
 
Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) noticed several empirical patterns in the auctions of 
collectable coins. Bidders often engage in sniping, submitting their bids close to the end 
of the auction. Sellers usually set the minimum bid significantly less than the items' 
book values and limit the use of secret reserve prices of high-value objects. A seller can 
increase the amount of bidders by setting a low minimum bid. A high book value, low 
negative ratings and high overall ratings also increase the amount of bidders. A seller 
can also decrease bidders' uncertainty about the value of the item in order to increase his 
profits. 
3.2. Signaling theory 
The markets generated by online auctions possess many similar features compared to 
the used cars market described by George A. Akerlof (1970) in his paper Market for 
"Lemons". Asymmetric information, and thus quality uncertainty of products in the 
market, set a demand for counteractive institutions such as brand-name or a license to 
practice. In eBay and other online auctions, the predominant counteractive institution is 
the reputation system, which provides each seller with a cumulative reputation score. In 
order to disclose real quality of their products and services prior purchase, sellers can 
use the mechanism of signaling.  In eBay, a seller can indicate the high quality of his 
products by using signals such as listing upgrades, which improve the visibility of 
listings (Melnik, Richardson & Thompkins 2011: 440). 
 
According to signaling theory, the reliability of the signal can be determined by 
comparing the costs of providing the signal between high-quality and low-quality 
sellers. If differential advantages exist in the costs of providing the signal, it is reliable. 
Costs can be direct, for example, paying for a use or access to a signal, such as a 
commercial.  Indirect costs include, for example, servicing repair claims, handling 
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complaints or returns and the loss of reputation due to the seller's inability to cover his 
claims of quality. (Melnik et al. 2011: 440)  
 
The relative cost advantage, or the lack of it, determines whether the signal can be 
trusted or not. In separating equilibrium, the high-quality sellers have a cost advantage 
over low-quality sellers. The low-quality sellers cannot copy the signals of high-quality 
sellers because the costs of providing the signal would be too high, thus the term 
separating. For example, a low-quality seller cannot offer a long warranty because of 
the resulting high service costs. The scenario called pooling equilibrium occurs when 
sellers of high quality have no cost advantage in signaling the superior quality of 
products. In this case, the sellers use the same signals and consumers cannot 
discriminate between high-quality and low-quality offerings. The low-quality sellers 
advertise or promote using the same rate schedule as the high-quality sellers, but do not 
intend to provide high-quality service in the long term. For example, a low-quality seller 
can offer a long warranty, but has no intention of providing service. (Melnik et al. 2011: 
441) 
  
In electronic commerce, and particularly in online auctions, buyers face two types of 
risk due to the anonymous nature of the business. In addition to the quality uncertainty 
of the product, buyers face transaction risk, which is related to the seller's honesty and 
ability to perform. Transaction risks realize when the seller pockets the money without 
sending the item, or when the item turns out to be something else than the seller 
described. (Andrews & Benzing 2007: 45) 
 
Dewally and Ederington (2006) describe four remedies of information asymmetry for a 
seller to alleviate the trust issues of e-commerce. By using these strategies, a seller can 
distinguish himself from low-quality sellers and increase his profits. First, a seller can 
acquire a third-party certificate indicating the high quality of his product. Second, a 
seller should establish an online reputation for himself. Two factors of reputation affect 
the price: how much is known about the seller (total feedback points) and whether it is 
good or bad (the percentage of positive feedback or the amount of negatives) of what is 
known about the seller. Third, a seller can offer a warranty in the form of a money-back 
guarantee. However, there is no empirical evidence of warranties increasing the price. 
Buyers might experience them as too costly, and they might also perceive that a true 
high-quality seller should acquire a certificate instead of offering a warranty. Fourth, a 
seller can provide additional information of his product, for example, pictures.  
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3.3. Reputation systems 
The business of eBay and many other online auctions is based on virtually anonymous 
transactions. In eBay, the only bit of information of a seller available for a buyer is the 
seller's pseudonym and email address. Although buyers and sellers are practically 
anonymous, they have to establish a trust in each other in order to conduct business. To 
understand the need for reputation system, we have to look into how trust is built 
naturally in long-term relationships. As people interact with each other over time, the 
past behavior and interactions inform them about their abilities and dispositions. Also, 
the expectation of reciprocity or retaliation in future interactions forces people to follow 
the precept of good behavior in the present. Political scientist Robert Axelrod called this 
"The shadow of the future", the expectation that people will consider each other's past 
actions in the future interactions sets constrains for present actions. (Resnick, 
Zeckhauser, Friedman & Kuwabara: 2000) 
 
The target of reputation systems is to form the shadow of the future to each transaction 
by creating an expectation that other people will look back on it. A seller on eBay may 
trade with thousands of buyers, from which each one contributes a feedback for the 
future buyers to see. This way a meaningful public history of the seller is constructed, 
and future buyers who lack a personal history with the seller may base their buying 
decision on the public one. Thus, the reasonable seller upholds his reputation by 
gathering as many positive feedbacks and avoiding negatives. (Resnick et al.: 2000) 
3.3.1 eBay's reputation system - Feedback Forum 
The seller's feedback profile in eBay consists of recent feedback ratings, detailed seller 
ratings and feedback comments. The recent feedback ratings tell how many positive, 
neutral and negative feedbacks the seller has received in the past twelve months. After 
the auction has ended the buyer can give a positive, neutral or negative feedback along 
with a short comment. Sellers receive one point per successful auction if the buyer gives 
a positive feedback. There is also a possibility for the buyer to leave a neutral or 
negative feedback if the buyer is dissatisfied. Neutral feedback does not affect the total 
feedback points, but negative feedback deducts one point. Seller's total score is shown 
after his pseudonym in parentheses. Total score takes into account only one positive 
point from single buyer, even if the buyer has many other successful and positive 




The percentage of positive feedback is calculated as follows: 
 
(5) 
         
                   
 
 
This yields a percentage, for example, 98.5%. It tells how many successful closed 
auctions the seller has had in the past twelve months. The number of neutral feedbacks 
does not have an effect to the feedback percentage. Feedback percentage is shown after 
the seller's total feedback score. (eBay Inc. 2011a) 
 
The percentage of positive feedback for sellers is on average more than 99%. Dellarocas 
& Wood (2008) estimate that on average 78.9% of eBay buyers are fully satisfied with 
the transaction, leaving 20.4% of buyers mildly dissatisfied and 0.7% very dissatisfied. 
In fear of retaliation from sellers and because of the reciprocal behavior typical to 
human nature, negative feedback often is not given, if the transaction was not entirely 
dissatisfactory for the buyer. The number is deceiving, because of the eBay feedback 
system, and positive feedback percentage calculation are not regarding unreported 
feedback of closed auctions. In addition, Wolf and Muhanna (2011) found that eBay 
users stress more the strength (the percentage of positive feedback) than the weight (the 
number of rated transactions) of seller feedback in their decision making thus possibly 
bringing inefficiencies to the market.  
 
In addition to feedback ratings, detailed seller ratings give the buyers more detailed 
information about the seller. Detailed seller ratings are given anonymously to courage 
the honesty of the buyer and thus improve the accuracy of the ratings. The categories in 
detailed seller ratings are: "Item as described", "Communication", "Shipping time" and 
"Shipping and handling charges". The buyer rates the seller's performance on a 1- to 5-
star scale. The ratings are then calculated on a rolling 12-month period. Detailed seller 
ratings are shown next to the recent feedback ratings in the seller's feedback profile. 
(eBay Inc. 2011b) 
 
According to conventional wisdom, the feedback points, written feedback and feedback 
percentage tell about the trustworthiness of the seller. However, there are theoretical 
arguments of both supporting and weakening such claims (Lucking-Reiley, Bryan, 
Prasad & Reeves 2007: 225). Chang and Wong (2011) suspect the effectiveness of 
eBay's binary reputation system which gives each seller and buyer an integer value. 
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They argue binary reputation systems are ineffective in their task of providing sufficient 
information for the bidders who seek to choose an appropriate seller. The first reason is 
that the credibility of a trader who has given feedback is not considered in the binary 
systems. High feedback score of a trader should add more value to his ratings. Second, 
the monetary value of a single trade is not considered. A sale of a $1000 laptop is 
considered equal to a sale of a $13 collectible postage stamp. Third, the factor of time 
decay is not considered by binary reputation systems. A feedback point gained a year 
ago has the same value as a point received more recently. Finally, the sales of items in 
different categories are considered as equal in the binary reputation systems. For 
example, a seller with high reputation gained from the sales of baseball cards might be 
unfamiliar in selling a laptop and thus providing weak quality of service. For selecting 
an appropriate seller, the authors suggest the use of a multi-attribute reputation 
management (MARM) tool, which takes into consideration the above four factors.  
3.3.2 The reputation system of Huuto.net 
The reputation system of Finnish online auction provider Huuto.net is quite similar 
compared to eBay's. Huuto.net lacks the detailed seller ratings, but has an identification 
service to increase the trust between sellers and buyers. After the auction has closed, 
buyer and seller have the opportunity to rate each other with positive, negative or 
neutral feedback. It is also possible to leave a short comment. The total score of the 
seller, comments and the positive feedback percentage is shown on the seller's profile 
page. Huuto.net does not distinguish the feedback received as a seller or buyer. The 
seller's total score is shown in parentheses after the pseudonym in the auction item page. 
This total score only takes into account one point from a single buyer excluding other 
possible points generated from transactions between the parties. (Huuto.net 2011a) 
  
In Huuto.net, it is possible for a user to identify by using online bank verification. User's 
personal information is sent from the bank to Huuto.net, including also social security 
number. Commerce between users whose real identity is known by Huuto.net should be 
more secure this way. A thumbs-up figure is shown next to an identified user's 
pseudonym. (Huuto.net 2011b) 
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3.4. The impact of reputation on the closing price and probability of sale 
After the internet made its breakthrough after mid 1990's, business has flourished for 
eBay and other minor internet auction providers. eBay has emphasized the meaning of 
its reputation system by now displaying auctions from sellers with a better reputation, 
lower shipping fees and lower prices first in the search results (Mickey 2010:168).  In 
the last 10 years, there have been a number of studies considering the impact of seller's 
reputation in online auctions.  
 
While studying a large amount of auctions of varying Nokia mobile phone models, 
Myllykoski (2008) found that higher seller's reputation had decreasing effect on closing 
probability of auction and no effect on the closing price. Reason for the reputation 
having no significant effect to the final price may be that more experienced sellers tend 
to set the reserve price of the phone higher than inexperienced sellers. The research data 
were also remarkably heterogeneous as it consisted of 125 different mobile phone 
models (over 9000 pieces) made by Nokia.  
 
In conclusion to Depken and Gregorius' (2010) study of eBay sales of the iPhone, they 
found that a higher seller reputation is positively related to the closing price. Auctions 
posted by sellers with no positive feedback ended with substantially lower prices. 
Sellers with no feedback received approximately $14 lower prices. Mickey (2010) has 
also studied how seller's reputation affects the closing price of three different versions 
(eight gigabyte, sixteen gigabyte and thirty-two gigabyte) of Apple iPod Touches. The 
higher the percentage of seller's negative feedback was, the lower the closing price. 
 
Huang, Cheng and Lu (2011) studied the impact of seller's reputation on the closing 
price and probability of Nokia 8250 mobile phones in Yahoo online auction. They 
found that seller's reputation only affects the closing probability of the auction, not the 
price. The higher a seller's reputation is, the higher the probability of his auction ending 
in a sale. Haley and Van Scyoc (2010) experienced similar results from the eBay 
auctions of collectible 1960s era baseball cards. They found that seller ratings and 
number of bids increase the probability of the auction ending with a price greater than 
the book value of the card. Further, they doubt the usefulness of seller reputation.  
  
A study of eBay auctions of Gmail invitations conducted by Lei (2011) showed that an 
improvement of one quintile from the lowest in the seller's reputation increased the 
probability of sale and the closing price. The item of auction is an internet link that 
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activates Gmail account for the owner of the link. Other characteristics of auctions were 
homogeneous as well: usually the description of the item was copied from Gmail's front 
page and the activation link was "shipped" by sending an email containing the link to 
the buyer.  
 
eBay has established eBay Motors, an online auction marketplace dedicated to trading 
used cars. The effect of seller's feedback points was significant in the used car auctions 
which had at least one bid, but the effect was small. The addition of one positive 
comment increased the amount of the highest bid by $1.04. The average of the highest 
bid being $6360, the effect of reputation was small. However, increase of one 
percentage point in the percentage of positive feedback increased the highest bid by 
$8.63. Further, the higher the positive feedback percentage was, the more likely the 
auction ended in a sale. The possible reasons for the above results may be that buyers 
receive relatively little information of the feedback percentage because most sellers' 
feedback percentage is close to 100%. Also, the amount of positive feedback may not be 
enough to convince buyers and the effect of negative feedback may be more striking. 
(Andrews & Benzing 2007) 
 
Houser and Wooders (2006) claim that previous studies of seller's reputations effects in 
online auctions are potentially biased for reasons that lie in collecting data. They 
collected the auction data of 94 different Pentium III 500 processors sold in eBay during 
the fall of 1999. The processors are generally homogeneous, and the high value of the 
processor was expected to cause reactions in buyers if something indicated that the 
seller was fraudulent. Collecting of data was made by hand with no aid from data 
collecting computer programs, thus enabling researchers to review the detailed item 
descriptions and carefully form dummy variables of the product characteristics. Also, 
the data from seller's feedback profile were recorded instantly after the auction closed. It 
turns out that the increase in seller's positive comments from 0 to 15 also increased the 
final sales price by 5% or about $12. On average, sellers with positive feedback gained 
$8.46 more than sellers with no positives. 
 
A theoretical model of bidder behavior was used to determine whether a seller's 
reputation had an effect to the probability of eliciting bids and the amount of bids and 
also the decision of how much to bid. The data consisted of rather valuable Taylor 
Made Firesole golf clubs, their mean price including shipping charges being $409.96. A 
seller with a few positive feedback points with comments was enough to convince 
bidders so that the probability of closing was 21% more likely compared to sellers with 
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no positive feedback. Also, the bid of the second highest bidder was considerably higher 
for the sellers with positive feedbacks. However, the marginal gains in the probability of 
closing the auction and the second highest bid were decreasing for sellers with an 
increasing amount of positive feedback in addition to the first few positives. (Livingston 
2005) 
 
In the first randomized controlled study of the value of eBay reputations in the natural 
setting of actual eBay auctions, Resnick et al. (2006) studied seller's reputation's impact 
on final price and closing probability of the auction. A seller with an already established 
reputation (net score above 2000) created a set of seven new sellers with negative or no 
positive reputation. The same experienced person was operating all the seller identities 
thus minimizing the differences and delivering the same outstanding service in 
communication, packaging and shipping. Vintage postcards being no standard items, the 
"lots" of postcards were sold in pairs. The description for each pair was controlled in a 
way that the information buyers saw was the same for the pair, but the layout varied so 
the buyers would not know that the same person was actually responsible for both 
auctions. A random device determined which item in each pair was sold by the strong 
seller with an established reputation and which one was sold by one of the new sellers. 
The conclusion for the study was that buyers were willing to pay 8.1% more to the 
seller with a strong reputation. On the other hand, it was noted that negative feedback 
had no impact to the closing price. (Resnick, Zeckhauser, Swanson & Lockwood: 2006) 
 
Huuto.net offers identification service to buyers and sellers in order to increase the 
security and trust between both parties. Myllykoski (2008) found that the auctions of 
identified sellers did not achieve a significant increase or decrease in the closing price, 
but the probability of sale was significantly weaker compared to the unidentified sellers. 
Only a small amount (14%) of the studied sellers had purchased the identified status. 
This could make the buyers indifferent to whether the seller was identified or not. Also, 
a group of sellers with more negative feedback may have used the identification service 
in order to increase the trust in buyers. 
 
Melnik and Alm (2002) studied the effect of seller's reputation to the auctions of rather 
homogeneous 1999 mint condition U.S $5 gold coins. Their empirical results show that 
reputation has a significant, but small effect on the closing price thus slightly increasing 
buyers' willingness to pay. In the case of heterogeneous auction item, U.S silver Morgan 
dollar coins in "Almost Uncirculated" condition, Melnik and Alm (2005) found that 
seller's overall reputation has a positive impact on buyer's willingness to pay. In 
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addition, negative comments have a negative impact to the closing price and 
reputational effects have a greater impact when there is more uncertainty of the coin.  
 
In one of the first papers of eBay's online auctions (first draft in 1999, published 2007), 
Lucking-Reiley, Bryan, Prasad and Reeves (2007) examined the determinants of price 
of U.S Cent (collectible coins) auctions. The total feedback points displayed in 
parentheses after the seller's pseudonym did not have a significant effect to the closing 
price. Despite of this, eBay users find negative comments more influential than positive. 
Increase of one percent in negatives causes a 0.11% decrease in closing price on 
average. Also Eaton (2007) has found evidence of the impact of negative feedback in 
the probability of closing the auction. Further, the timing of the received negative 
comments seems to be the dominant factor. Sellers who had received a negative 
comment in the previous month experienced a 26% decrease in probability of sale. The 
increase of one percent in negative reports in the last six months reduced the probability 
of sale by 15%. Eaton's (2007) study indicates that eBay users tend to forgive sellers 
with a history of bad reputation and in turn the study of Lucking-Reiley et al. (2007) 
indicates that buyers believe in the honesty of the seller if there is no negative feedback. 
 
Shen, Chiou and Kuo (2011) experienced similar results with Lucking-Reiley et al. 
(2007) and Eaton (2008). Their study sample consisted of 5013 finished auctions of 
laptops in eBay USA during one month period in the fall of 2004. Laptops were chosen 
because of their considerable monetary cost and wide quality variation. In the auctions 
of laptops as well, seller's negative feedback had a greater impact than positive feedback 
on three dimensions: number of bids received, the probability of auction ending in a sale 
and the closing price. The impact of seller's positive feedback was remarkably small: 
one point increase in the feedback increased the closing price on average by only 
0.0005%. Further, increasing the amount of negative feedback by 10% decreased the 
final price by $2.57.  
 
Most of the recent empirical studies considering seller's reputation have been conducted 
using cross-sectional statistical techniques in order to find out the impact of reputation. 
In his study considering auctions of heterogeneous artwork, Canals-Cerdá (2012) used 
panel data techniques. His findings were consistent with the previous studies of seller's 
reputation. Seasoned sellers with a high feedback score did not experience increase in 
closing price or closing probability of the auction. The additional points did not bring 
any benefits for the experienced sellers. Equivalent with the results of previous studies, 
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the impact of negative feedback was statistically significant and large in magnitude. A 
one-point increase in negative feedback reduces the closing price on average by 4.7%. 
 
Melnik et al. (2011) noticed that the percentage of positive feedback did not bring any 
improvements to the closing probability of the auction. The accumulated feedback 
points had a small but statistically significant negative impact on the probability of sale. 
The results might seem counterintuitive, but they make sense. The rapid growth of eBay 
intensifies the competition between sellers and the probability on sale decreases over 
time as new sellers enter the market. The increased amount of positive feedback points 
are swamped by the sheer number of competitors. However, if a reputable seller is 
selected, he may experience a price premium.  
 
A table summarizing the impact of a seller's reputation on the closing price and 
probability can be found in appendix 1. The items have been roughly categorized as 
homogeneous or heterogeneous. The reviewed literature suggests that the effect of a 
seller's reputation to the outcome of an auction is not straightforward. The growing 
amount of feedback points seems to bring little or no benefit for a seller who is aiming 
to a higher closing price. The first few positive feedback points seem to convince the 
buyers of the seller's trustworthy. The reputation system seems to do its task by giving 
sellers the incentives to conduct honest trading. Further, the properties of the item of the 
auction seem to determine some of the reputation's effects. On the basis of auction 
theory, whether the item possesses components of independent-private-values or pure 
common model, seller's reputation may dampen or strengthen the effects to the closing 
price and probability of a sale. Not surprisingly, the amount of negative feedback has a 
stronger effect than positive feedback. The sellers with negatives experience a decline in 
the probability of successfully closing their auctions. The buyers' willingness to spend is 
lower as well in this case.  
 
Based on the reviewed empirical literature and auction theory as well, hypotheses 
considering the effects of seller's reputation follow: 
 
H1: A higher total feedback score increases the price and probability of sale. 
 
H2: The growth of positive feedback increases the price and probability of sale. 
 





H4: Identified sellers achieve a higher closing price and probability of sale. 
 
H5: Sellers with no established reputation experience a decline in the closing price and 
probability of sale. 
3.5. The impact of promoting on the closing price and probability of sale 
For a single auction, there are many variables that impact on the auction results, such as 
the closing time of the auction, the existence and amount of reserve price and the length 
together with ending time of the auction. However, the following section is dedicated to 
exploring the effects of different sales promotion methods which the seller can use to 
achieve a higher price and probability of closing the auction. 
 
eBay being the biggest online auction site in the world, a single item up for auction does 
not always stand out from thousands of other listings. eBay provides sellers the 
possibility to differentiate their listings and hence possibly attract more buyers for their 
auctions (eBay Inc. 2011c). The listing upgrades each have their own cost, so they are 
unnecessary if the seller does not gain any surplus from purchasing upgrades (Depken 
& Gregorius 2010). eBay also offers a buyer's insurance service via PayPal. Sellers, 
who decided to offer the insurance service for the bidders, experienced an increase in 
the final price compared to the book value of the item (Haley & Van Scyoc 2010). 
 
Depken and Gregorius (2010) studied over 25 000 auctions of 8 GB iPhones 
immediately after its launch in October-November 2007. Different auction 
characteristics were studied, such as the length of the auction title and sub-title, whether 
the seller purchased a bold font or picture, or whether the seller paid to be highlighted or 
featured. Also, the influence of exclamation points in the title of the auction was studied 
with the presumption of a seller using multiple exclamation points in the title being less 
honest than sellers not drawing attention in such manner. Auctions where the title or 
subtitle contained two or more exclamation marks closed 6% less often than auctions 
without such markings. Might be that potential buyers took the exclamation points as a 




Purchasing longer auction titles and subtitles were statistically and significantly related 
to higher closing price, but subtitle had a stronger impact. Sellers who bought the 
subtitle for the cost of $0.50 received $6.65 higher ending price on average. Bold font 
and a picture both increased closing prices and yielded net surplus for the seller. The 
cost of bold font was $1 and $0.35 for the picture. Bold font had a $4.38 increase and 
the picture $5.86 increase in the closing price. Also, the highlight feature increased 
closing price by $7.45 and was profitable for the seller because of its price $5. 
Purchasing eBay's featured status was not related positively with the closing price and 
thus was not justified in the iPhones auctions considering its price of $19.95. (Depken 
& Gregorius 2010) 
 
The effects of a clear title, number of pictures and whether the seller had purchased a 
featured-status to their auction had a significant effect also to the results to the auctions 
of used cars in eBay Motors. Clear title for a used car auction brought on average a 
$1.147 increase to the highest bid compared to a car without a clear title. The amount of 
pictures per car auction had an interesting effect to the closing price premium: Increase 
of one picture caused the price premium to decrease by $273. Andrews and Benzing 
(2007) discuss it is possible that the pictures might reveal essential flaws in the car 
being sold and hence lower the price. However, the lower price might be justified 
because of the exposed condition of the car. Purchasing the "featured" status for the 
auction did not bring any benefits in closing price or probability. Explanation for this 
may be that buyers know that purchasing the featured item does not have an association 
with the quality of the car. Also, buyers are prepared to search through a large number 
of cars before making any decisions making the early spot in the listings irrelevant. 
(Andrews & Benzing 2007) 
 
Not surprisingly, the effect of images and title length was almost entirely contradictory 
compared to the results of Andrews and Benzing (2007) when the subject of the auction 
was laptops. More product images resulted in an increased amount of bids and a higher 
closing price, but it did not have effect to the probability of closing. However, adding 
high-quality images to the item description increased both the probability of sale and the 
closing price. Submitting a lengthier description for the auction brought higher results in 
the number of bidders, the probability of sale and closing price. Other conventional 
indicators of sellers' trustworthy such as using a table to present product specifics, 
stating the reason for selling and posting a reference price, also had an increasing 




A seller who wants to maximize his profits can use several signaling strategies to 
indicate the high quality of his products. Both the variance in the quality of collectible 
comic books and the buyer's inability to inspect the product in advance increase the 
information asymmetry between buyers and sellers. As in previous studies, the 
reputation of a seller had an increasing effect to the closing price, even after the first 
few positive feedbacks. Also, the better the ratio of positive and negative feedback, the 
higher the price. Acquiring a certificate from a respected third-party for the comic book 
increased the closing price on average by 50%. There are two reasons for this dramatic 
increase of the closing price. First, bidders' valuations are lower for a comic that is 
claimed to represent a certain grade, but the seller has not purchased a certificate to 
verify the claim. Second, bidders experience that certification lowers the overall risk 
involved. Offering warranties did not bring any price benefits for the sellers. Bidders 
may experience enforcing warranties as too costly activity. Another explanation is that 
other signaling strategies, such as certificates, may be experienced as more effective. 
The seller's inability to provide additional information of the product, in this case scans 
of the comics, did decrease the price by 11%-16%. The sellers who failed to provide 
additional information were generally inexperienced, so the buyers might have 
conjectured that the lack of a scan reflects more a lack of sophistication and resources, 
than low quality of service. (Dewally & Ederington 2006)  
 
In order to alleviate the problem of asymmetric information and thus bidders' 
uncertainty of product quality, the sellers can provide more information of the auction 
item. Li, Srinivasan & Sun (2009) studied the auctions of paintings and silver plates in 
eBay. The items were conjectured to possess elements of affiliation and asymmetric 
information induced problems because their values could be determined by future resale 
prices. Seller's quality indicators were categorized as direct and indirect indicators. 
Direct quality indicators include postings of multiple pictures, money-back guarantees 
and product certification. Indirect quality indicators include minimum bid, hidden 
reserve price and the Buy-It-Now option. Seller's credibility indicators consist of seller 
rating points, third-party payment option, and seller certification.  
 
Posting multiple pictures or granting money-back guarantee reduced the incomplete 
information of bidders and increased the amount of auction participants. However, 
rational bidders expect more bidders for a high-quality product and, therefore, shade 
their bids in order to avoid the winner's curse. Also, the bidders' bid rates increase and 
they bid early because they do not need to rely information conveyed by rival bids. In 
contrast to direct indicators, setting a reserve price or the Buy-It-Now option increased 
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willingness to bid and bidding amount, making bidders less likely to participate. 
Reserve prices and Buy-It-Now option reduce the amount of bidders with low 
willingness to pay and high participation costs. The bidders experience the effect of 
winner's curse dampened when fewer bidders participate, increasing their willingness to 
bid and the amount of bids. Seller's feedback rating and the use of third-party payment 
methods increase the participants of high-credibility sellers' auctions. Bidders also shade 
their bids more because of the high amount of participants in the auction. High seller's 
credibility indicators (ratings and third-party payment method) amplify the effects of 
quality indicators thus inducing bidders to participate in the auction more likely, submit 
bids earlier and shade their bids. (Li, Srinivasan & Sun 2009) 
 
In support to the hypothesis of Melnik et al. (2011), the use of listing upgrades bold, 
border, highlight and 10-day listing had no significant impact on the closing price or 
probability of Garmin 350 GPS consumer-electronic product. However, the use of 
subtitle promotion both increased the closing probability by 1.5% and brought on 
average a hefty $19.86 or 6% increase to the closing price. The use of featured 
promotion makes finding items easier and thus increases the closing probability by a 
slight 1%, but does not affect the closing price. These results clearly suggest that bold, 
border and highlight are not worth the cost. The reason for these listing upgrades having 
no impact on the closing price might be due to their availability to all sellers with the 
same fee schedule. Another reason might be that listing upgrades bold, border and 
highlight can be copied by all sellers regardless of the quality of their products. 
However, the use of promotional method subtitle can bring a considerable price 
premium for the seller and certainly pays off in most cases.  
 
The results in the above studies suggest that a clear and appropriate presentation of the 
specifics of the item up for auction is an indicator of seller's trustworthy and thus brings 
benefits in the form of higher price to the seller. Sellers can also alleviate the problem of 
asymmetric information by providing detailed information of the product or acquiring a 
certificate from a trusted third-party. Further, the appropriate use of listing upgrades 
helps sellers to achieve higher closing prices.  
 
In Huuto.net, it is possible for the sellers to purchase equivalent upgrades for their 
listings. It is stated by Huuto.net (2011c) that the following upgrades bring twelve times 
more views to the seller's listing. Advertised increase in views is based on the average 
increase of each listing's site traffic when the seller has purchased one of the upgrades. 
Regarding the above empirical results and auction theory (see McAfee & McMillan 
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1987: 711) as well, more views should increase the closing price. In this case, the 
assumption is that the amount of views increases the amount of bidders. On the basis of 
these conclusions, hypothesis follows. 
 
H6: The purchasing of promotional options showcase, listing picture, background color 




4.1. Data from Huuto.net 
Huuto.net is the oldest and most popular online auction site in Finland. Data for the 
study consist of closed auctions of Apple's popular mobile phone model iPhone 4S 16 
GB during the summer and fall of 2012. The main reason for selecting the auctions of 
iPhone 4S 16 GB as the data of the study are their homogeneous characteristics 
compared to Myllykoski's (2008) master's thesis where his data consisted of 125 
different Nokia mobile phone models, sample size being over 9000 auctions. Apple's 
mobile phones are widely considered as valuable and popular merchandise. A quick 
search in Huuto.net using a keyword "iPhone 4S" resulted in over 500 closed auctions 
from the last two months. The monetary value of iPhone 4S models is relatively high 
varying from 180 to 600 euros in the dataset. It is presumed that the value of the iPhone 
would make bidders pay more attention to the feedback score of the seller. 
4.2. Data collection 
The final dataset consists of 227 auctions of iPhone 4S 16 GB from 138 individual 
sellers. The auctions took place in Huuto.net between July 4
th
 and October 5
th
, 2012. 
Special computer software was programmed in order to collect the data of closed 
auctions and the feedback information of sellers. The software runs on a Linux Debian 
server and is written in Java computer programming language. The main components of 
the software are Regex and Cronjob which are used to parse the HTML code and 
schedule the activity of the software, respectively. The software downloads the 
department listing containing open auction IDs of a single department such as Apple 
iPhones. After that the information of every auction, its bids and seller's feedback 
information is parsed from the HTML code and stored into an SQL database. This 
procedure runs once in an hour, and information of a single auction and its seller are, 
therefore, updated every hour. When the program notices a closed auction its and its 
seller's final information is stored and is no more updated. 
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4.3. Data processing before analysis 
All auction items of a single department were stored into the database, due to the 
technical properties of the data collection software. The data were then downloaded 
from the SQL database to Microsoft Excel 2010 into spreadsheet form for filtering and 
executing necessary calculations in order to achieve correct values for all variables. 
Although the Huuto.net department "Mobile phones, Apple" was meant to only for 
auctions of Apple iPhones, it was infested with iPhone-related accessories such as 
personalized iPhone covers, spare parts such as chargers and replacement glasses and 
screen protectors. Therefore in the beginning of filtering the data there was 4053 
auctions and most of them had to be removed. 
 
iPhone 4S type mobile phones were identified by the information in their auction's title. 
If there was not enough information in the title, the auction announcement was read for 
the missing information. Auctions were deleted from the dataset if the title or 
announcement did not possess enough information to identify, for example, the iPhone's 
amount of memory. The iPhone's condition and other possible characteristics were also 
determined by reading the announcement. All auctions with iPhones which had cracks 
or fractures in their front or rear glass were deleted from the dataset. However, iPhones 
with minor scratches were accepted because scratches were considered as signs of 
normal use. If the seller had replaced the broken glass by herself and announced that she 
had done so thus voiding the warranty, the iPhone was accepted to the dataset. This is 
justified because even a perfectly kept iPhone loses its warranty after time and the 
dataset consisted of either new or used phones with insignificant defects at most. 
However if the glass had been changed to modify the appearance of the phone and the 
outcome varied from the looks of the original iPhone, the auction was deleted from the 
dataset. Only the auctions in which the iPhone possessed the original Black or White 
look were accepted. Auctions where seller had left the color of the iPhone unsaid or was 
indicated only by a picture attached to the announcement were accepted to the dataset as 
the color was not presumed as a crucial factor of the closing price. All modified iPhone 
auctions were deleted. iPhones with software modifications unaccepted by Apple were 
also deleted. 
 
In case of fraudulent actions of the seller or other ambiguity relating to the auction, the 
maintenance team of Huuto.net has the authority to end bidding and close auctions to 
protect users from mishaps. The data collecting software was designed to notice illegal 
auctions, and it was possible to remove these auctions from the dataset. Multiunit 
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auctions were removed also. In Huuto.net, the seller is also able to manage risks 
involved in online trading. The seller is able to restrict bidders to participate in their 
auction by setting a requirement for the bidder's feedback score. The auctions where 
bidders' participation was restricted on the basis of bidders' feedback score were 
removed.  
 
Sellers have the ability to post a sales announcement without having an auction. In this 
case, they have chosen the Huuto.net's BuyNow -option which is similar to eBay's Buy 
It Now method. It is also possible to have an auction and still add the BuyNow feature. 
In this case, bidders are able to decide whether they would like to buy the item passing 
the bidding process, or they can choose to start bidding. The sales announcements with 
only BuyNow feature were removed from the dataset as there was no actual auction in 
progress. Huuto.net offers sellers the possibility to identify themselves as an enterprise 
if they conduct a lot of business through Huuto.net. Auctions, which had sellers 
identified as an enterprise, were removed. 
 
After all the processing, the dataset consisted of 227 auctions of Apple iPhone 4S 16 
GB mobile phones. The phones in these auctions were either new, or they had minor, 
TABLE 1. Summary statistics.
Variable Quantity Mean
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum Observations
Promotional options
Showcase 9 0.040 0 1 227
Listing picture 165 0.727 0 1 227
Background color 4 0.018 0 1 227
Bold and colorful font 7 0.031 0 1 227
Auction / Item Characteristics
Sold 112 0.493 0.501 0 1 227
Price 112 379.653 80.293 180 600 227
9.99€ / 12 months or 2.99€/month Starting price 227 316.718 127.214 0 550 227
Reserve price 26 0.115 0 1 227
BuyNow 58 0.256 0 1 227
BuyNow price 58 450.879 67.341 320 600 227
Color White 94 0.414 0 1 198
Color Black 104 0.458 0 1 198
Carrier lock 98 0.432 0 1 202
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nearly insignificant scratches in their back or front glass, at most. The color was the 
standard black or white. Summary statistics of the dataset are shown in table 1. 
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Huuto.net possesses some distinct features that are not present in eBay. For basic users 
the fundamental functions, such as listing and selling an item, are free of charge. This 
allows most basic users to repost their items up for auction limitlessly if the previous 
auction did not end in a sale. This phenomenon could be clearly seen in the dataset as 
most reposting sellers did not bother to change their auction announcement's header or 
contents. Huuto.net only takes a dealer's commission if the seller is an enterprise or a 
power seller. The final dataset contained only a few auctions where the seller was a 
power seller. 
 
Huuto.net awards traders with 100 successful closed auctions per year as a "Power 
seller". According to Huuto.net, power sellers are reliable and experienced traders who 
provide effortless trading. Huuto.net offers some benefits for power sellers, for 
example, a 10% discount when purchasing listing upgrades and possibility to identify 
without a charge. Due to the constantly growing amount of traders in Huuto.net, also the 
amount of power sellers should be growing. However, the status of power seller also 
brings some disadvantages compared to normal sellers. For normal traders, basic 
functions are free, such as listing and selling an item. Power sellers are required to pay a 
fee of 3.9% of the closing price (maximum 9.90€) to Huuto.net if the auction closes 
successfully. (Huuto.net 2011c) 
 
Identified Huuto.net users are awarded a thumbs-up figure which is displayed after the 
seller's pseudonym. Acquiring identification is free of charge. According to Huuto.net 
identified users are more reliable than users who have not been identified themselves. 
The percentage of identified sellers in the dataset is 62.3 percent. Compared to 
Myllykoski's (2008) study a few years earlier, the amount of identified sellers has 
skyrocketed in a few years.  
 
In Finland, iPhones can be purchased either "locked" to a certain carrier's network or as 
a "SIM free" version. Usually the "lock" is removed after the phone has been fully paid. 
Locked iPhones only accept SIM cards acquired from certain operators, usually the one 
which the phone is bought from. This forces the buyer to consider her willingness to 
possibly change and stick to another carrier for a period of time. The lock can be 
removed by either paying a fee to the carrier or making software modifications to the 
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phone which voids the warranty at the same time. SIM free iPhones accept SIM cards 
from any operator and the buyer can use SIM cards from any carrier she likes. The 
amount of carrier locked iPhones was 43.2 percent in the dataset.  
 
The sellers' feedback information in the dataset turns out to be rather unique when 
compared to recent studies addressing the same subject. One of the distinct features of 
the data collection software was to store the information of every seller's each received 
feedback point into the database. Hence the date and time, tone, submitter and whether 
the seller has received the feedback as a seller or buyer are known for each feedback 
point. Therefore each seller's total feedback score can be conveniently calculated by the 
ending time of the auction. The variables presenting feedback score and the amount of 
positive, negative and neutral feedback are equal to what the bidders have seen when 
TABLE 2. Sellers' feedback summary statistics.
Quantity Mean Observations
Identified sellers 86 0.623 138
Unidentified sellers 52 0.377 138
Power sellers 6 0.043 138
No established reputation* 18 0.130 138
All sellers
Positives Neutrals Negatives Total feedback score
Mean 93.326 0.884 0.667 71.616
Standard deviation 262.921 2.011 1.436 172.047
Minimum 0 0 0 -1.000
Maximum 1933.000 13.000 9.000 1256.000
Identified sellers
Positives Neutrals Negatives Total feedback score
Mean 118.570 0.907 0.721 88.000
Standard deviation 310.434 1.870 1.554 191.127
Minimum 0 0 0 0
Maximum 1933.000 13.000 9.000 1256.000
Unidentified sellers
Positives Neutrals Negatives Total feedback score
Mean 51.577 0.846 0.577 44.519
Standard deviation 149.091 2.244 1.226 132.026
Minimum 0 0 0 -1.000
Maximum 930.000 10.000 6.000 855.000
* Seller has no positive, neutral or negative feedback.
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they have participated in the bidding. Summary statistics of sellers' feedback are shown 
in table 2.  
5.1. Variables 
Two sets of statistical models are constructed for both dependent variables. Dependent 
variables are the ending price of an auction (PRICE) and the probability of sale 
(PROBABIL). PROBABIL has been calculated for each auction Ai separately by 
dividing one with the number of iPhone 4S 16 GB auctions that have been in progress 
during auction Ai. To test the hypotheses presented before, explanatory variables can be 
divided into two sections representing either features or information about the sellers or 
the auction. TSCORERT, TPOS, TNEUTR and TNEG represent the total feedback 
score and the total number of positive, neutral and negative feedback points acquired by 
the seller, respectively. All sellers' feedback scores are calculated to match the real 
scores bidders have surveyed while the auction has been in progress. Dummy variable 
IDENTIFI tells whether the seller has identified herself or not. If the seller has not 
established a reputation and has no positive, neutral or negative feedbacks, the value of 
dummy variable TSCOZERO is set to one. Auction characteristics are described by 
dummy variables SHOWCASE, LISTPIC, BGCOLOR and BOLDANDC indicating 
seller's choice of used listing upgrades. SHOWCASE stands for listing upgrade which 
promotes seller's listing by positioning it onto a special showcase section above normal 
listings in the section and search view. LISTPIC stands for the use of small picture next 
to the listing's header. BGCOLOR stands for the use of colorful background which 
should distinguish seller's listing from others, and BOLDANDC indicates whether the 
seller has chosen to promote his listing by purchasing a bold and colorful listing header. 
The fees of the listing upgrades are shown in table 3. 
 
TABLE 3. Fees of purchasable promotional options.




Bold and colorful font 0.49
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A set of dummy control variables is established. The following features of either the 
iPhone or its seller are controlled. COLWHITE stands for the color, 1 meaning white 
and 0 black. CARRLOCK stands for carrier locked iPhones. BUYNOW identifies 
auctions where the seller had chosen the BuyNow option in addition to traditional 
auction. POWERSEL indicates whether the seller has been awarded a power seller 
status. RESPRICE stands for the seller's choice to use hidden reserve price.  
5.2. Statistical methods and tests of hypotheses 
The statistical method used in this study is multiple linear regression analysis. 
Dependent variables are the ending price of a successful auction and the probability of 
sale for all auctions. The approval or rejecting of the presented hypotheses is based on 
the interpretation of the parameter estimate and its statistical significance for each 
explanatory variable in the statistical models presented below. Hypotheses, variables 
and their suitable accidentals, which have been set in accordance to the hypothesis are 
shown in table 4. 
 
Both dependent variables PRICE and PROBABIL have six regression specifications. 
The first model measures the effect of seller's total feedback score, whether she has 
identified or not and the effect of used listing upgrades. The second model is equivalent 
to the first except the total feedback score has been replaced by the number of positive, 
neutral and negative feedbacks. The third specification is also equivalent to the first, but 
the total feedback score is replaced with a dummy variable indicating whether the seller 
has established a reputation or not. The fourth, fifth and sixth model is equivalent to the 
first, second and third, respectively, but a set of five control variables presented in the 
above section have been added to each model. Resulted regression coefficients and 
statistical significance levels for each explanatory variable are shown in table 5 and 6 











 H1: A higher total feedback score increases the price and 
probability of sale. 
TSCORE(+) P(1,4), B(1,4) 
    
 H2: The growth of positive feedback increases the price and 
probability of sale. 
TPOS(+)  P(2,5), B(2,5) 
 
    
 H3: The increase of neutral and negative feedback decreases 






    
 H4: Identified sellers achieve a higher closing price and 
probability of sale. 
IDENTIFI(+) P(1,2,3,4,5,6) 
B(1,2,3,4,5,6) 
    
 H5: Sellers with no established reputation experience a 
decline in closing price and probability of sale. 
TSCOZERO(-) P(3,6) B(3,6) 
    
Promotional options 
 H6: The purchasing of promotional options showcase, listing 
picture, background color or bold and colorful font increases 










 iPhone is carrier locked CARRLOCK(-) P(4,5,6), B(4,5,6) 
    
 iPhone is White WHITE() P(4,5,6), B(4,5,6) 
    
 Seller has been awarded a power seller status POWERSEL(+) P(4,5,6), B(4,5,6) 
    
 Auction has BuyNow feature BUYNOW() P(4,5,6), B(4,5,6) 
    
 Seller has set a reserve price RESPRICE() P(4,5,6), B(4,5,6) 









TABLE 5. Regression coefficients for dependent variable PRICE.
Sample size 112 112 112 88 88 88










IDENTIFI 57.1434 60.5995 34.2137 40.3600 44.4118 12.0604
(14.8471) *** (14.8400) *** (15.8984) * (19.1809) * (19.5298) * (19.4421)
TSCOZERO -67.15127 -81.7872
(21.2725) ** (22.9213) ***
Listing upgrades
SHOWCASE 56.5170 57.3138 54.0937 35.1513 29.7697 18.0642
(46.5632) (46.6804) (44.2404) (46.8734) (47.1955) (42.0128)
LISTPIC 1.9574 -2.1922 -3.9360 -9.1848 -13.2049 -15.7643
(16.2106) (16.2206) (15.6095) (19.4417) (19.7227) (17.8242)
BGCOLOR 53.3521 59.8777 50.1197 52.0446 42.8911 37.6442
(54.6187) (54.5093) (49.5434) (55.9537) (54.8018) (45.2596)
BOLDANDC 17.3719 9.9250 15.1948 28.5137 34.7983 34.4531
(57.8272) (58.2308) (54.1772) (56.0538) (56.4537) (49.3018)
Control variables
CARRLOCK -59.5393 -57.9559 -75.2717
(15.8747) *** (16.1526) *** (15.0393) ***
COLWHITE -23.8514 -26.3115 -23.3251
(15.2292) (15.3912) # (14.0909)
POWERSEL 29.2172 19.5119 22.2359
(64.1510) (75.2902) (39.8930)
BUYNOW 26.0242 20.0963 30.6982
(20.8060) (21.2948) (19.3009)
RESPRICE 43.5026 38.8490 43.5653
(30.5464) (30.7731) (28.2477)
Constant/Intercept 335.4278 342.4036 365.8494 383.4262 389.5595 426.7260
(17.1308) *** (17.2951) *** (18.9034) *** (23.3218) *** (23.6868) *** (24.5649) ***
R-square 0.1963 0.225 0.2655 0.3651 0.3814 0.4562
Adj. R-square 0.1504 *** 0.1648 *** 0.2235 *** 0.2732 *** 0.2727 *** 0.3775 ***
Note: Standard deviation is in parentheses. Statistical significance levels: # = 0.1 > p > 0.05; * = 0.05 > p > 0.01;





TABLE 6. Regression coefficients for dependent variable PROBABIL.
Sample size 227 227 227 176 176 176










IDENTIFI 0.00845 0.00914 0.00798 0.00809 0.01057 0.00786




SHOWCASE -0.00858 -0.00910 -0.00730 -0.00776 -0.00855 -0.00405
(0.02053) (0.0207) (0.02058) (0.02616) (0.02646) (0.02637)
LISTPIC -0.00440 -0.00448 -0.00507 -0.00258 -0.00384 -0.00398
(0.00778) (0.00788) (0.0078) (0.00954) (0.00967) (0.00963)
BGCOLOR 0.06108 0.06089 0.06875 0.05270 0.05378 0.06763
(0.03265) # (0.03293) # (0.03209) * (0.03501) (0.03534) (0.03415) *
BOLDANDC -0.04353 -0.04309 -0.04782 -0.04601 -0.04709 -0.05306
(0.02785) (0.02808) (0.02770) # (0.03113) (0.03148) (0.03111) #
Control variables
CARRLOCK -0.01533 -0.01471 -0.01376
(0.00903) # (0.0092) (0.00911)
COLWHITE -0.02070 -0.02140 -0.02132
(0.0086) * (0.00876) * (0.00878) *
POWERSEL -0.02198 -0.03038 0.00622
(0.03338) (0.04013) (0.02902)
BUYNOW -0.00800 -0.01056 -0.00877
(0.01085) (0.0113) (0.01095)
RESPRICE 0.00788 0.00553 0.00658
(0.01332) (0.01364) (0.01351)
Constant/Intercept 0.06098 0.06095 0.06422 0.07982 0.08214 0.08374
(0.0082) *** (0.00843) *** (0.0089) *** (0.01187) *** (0.01209) *** (0.01254) ***
R-Square 0.04240 0.04170 0.03650 0.09810 0.09700 0.08280
Adjusted R-Square 0.01630 0.00660 0.01030 0.03760 # 0.02450 0.02130
Note: Standard deviation is in parentheses. Statistical significance levels: # = 0.1 > p > 0.05; * = 0.05 > p > 0.01;
** = 0.01 > p > 0.001; *** = p < 0.001.
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5.3. Seller reputation 
H1: A higher total feedback score increases the price and probability of sale. 
 
In short, the total feedback score had no notable impact to the final selling price or 
probability of sale in any of the models. The only model where the impact of total 
feedback score was statistically significant at 10% level was B(4). In this case, the 
growth of one positive feedback point brought on average a 0,005 percentage point 
increase to the probability of sale. Therefore there is insufficient evidence to support the 
hypothesis. The results are similar with recent studies considering the effect of seller 
reputation to the ending price and probability of sale (Melnik et al. 2011; Huang et al. 
2011; Haley & Van Scyoc 2010). 
 
H2: The growth of positive feedback increases the price and probability of sale. 
 
Against expectations, sellers did not seem to benefit from the growth of positive 
feedback as the impact of a growing amount of positive feedback had no significant 
impact on the closing price or probability of sale.  
 
H3: The increase of neutral and negative feedback decreases the price and probability of 
sale. 
 
The effect of increasing neutral feedback was nonexistent but negative feedback had a 
significant impact on the closing price. Increase of one negative feedback point 
decreased seller's final price on average by 11.6€. This outcome is in line with many 
other recent studies considering seller reputation (Canals-Cerdá 2012; Shen et al. 2011; 
Lucking-Reiley et al. 2007). 
 
H4: Identified sellers achieve a higher closing price and probability of sale. 
 
Identified sellers did not experience any increase in the probability of sale. Although in 
the dataset where sellers' feedback score was less than one hundred, the effect of 
identification increased the probability of sale by 1.5 percentage point at 10% 
significance level. The impact of sellers' identified status to the final sales price was 
considerable and statistically significant in all but one of the specifications. In 
specifications from one to five, acquiring identification brought an average increase to 
the final price which varied from 34.21€ to 60.60€. Taking into account iPhone's 
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average final sales price of 379.65€, the effect is considerable. In a dataset that 
contained auctions from only sellers that had their total feedback score lower than 100, 
the effect of identification was similar, but yet stronger. In specifications from one to 
five, in the lower than 100 total feedback score group, the average increase varied on 
from 43.22€ to 64.82€. This suggests that the importance of identification is higher if a 
seller's feedback score is lower than 100 points. These results show strong support to the 
hypothesis on behalf of the closing price. There is however no evidence to support the 
hypothesis on behalf of the probability of sale. Therefore the hypothesis is partially 
accepted. 
 
H5: Sellers with no established reputation experience a decline in the closing price and 
probability of sale. 
 
The evidence shows strong support to the hypothesis on the part of price. Sellers with 
no established reputation truly experienced a substantial decline in the final price. In 
specification three where no control variables were present, the average decline of price 
was 67.15€. In specification number six the decline was on average 81.79€. Seller's 
inexperience did not effect to the closing probability of the auction. These results clearly 
indicate that buyers are willing to buy from inexperienced sellers as much from 
experienced, but the increased risk is reflected in the final price. In the dataset where all 
sellers' feedback score was less than one hundred, the nonexistent reputation resulted in 
similar decline in the final price.  
5.4. Promotional options 
H6: The purchasing of promotional options showcase, listing picture, background color 
or bold and colorful font increases the closing price and probability of sale. 
 
In any of the specifications, sellers' use of promotional options had no effects to the 
final sales prices. The results are similar with the study of Melnik et al. (2011) where 
promotional options that focus on display enhancements did not bring any benefits to 
price. Interestingly, Depken and Gregorius (2010) found that display-enhancing 
promotional options bold font, listing picture and highlight each increased the average 
price in the auctions of first generation iPhones. In both studies the use of promotional 
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method "featured", which is comparable to the Huuto.net's promotional option 
showcase, did not have a significant effect to the closing price. 
 
Interestingly, paying for a better visibility for one's listing did not effect to the 
probability of sale either. Paying the minimum fee of 3.99€ for the promotional option 
showcase is therefore unnecessary if the seller is aiming for a higher price or probability 
of sale. Either the small listing picture, used in 72.7% of the auctions, did not improve 
seller's chances to sell the iPhone. In this case also it is unnecessary to purchase the 
upgrade for the price of 0.99€. Apparently the small picture does not signal the quality 
of the iPhone or convince buyers of the seller's trustworthiness and therefore no impact 
is shown in the final price or probability. 
 
Seller's choice to use background color for her listing increased the probability of sale 
on average by six percentage points. The impact was statistically significant in four of 
the six specifications for PROBABIL. Surprisingly the use of bold and colorful font 
decreased the probability of sale.  
5.5. Control variables 
Buyers of the iPhone 4S 16 GB model seemed to put a lot of weight on the fact whether 
the phone was carrier locked or not. In specifications P(4,5,6) the average price decline 
of carrier locked iPhones varied from 57.96€ to 75.27€. Carrier lock also decreased the 
probability of sale by 1.53 percentage points in specification B(4). 
 
It seems that black is always in fashion when it comes to the color of the phone. White 
color of the iPhone decreased the sales price by 26.31€ in specification P(5) at 10% 
significance level. In the other specifications with control variables the price decreased 
similar amounts, but the results were only almost significant at 10% level. The 
probability of sale decreased by roughly two percentage points all three specifications 
and the results were significant at 5% level. 
 
The power seller status, use of the BuyNow feature or reserve price had no effect to the 






The purpose of this thesis is to study the effects of seller reputation and selected 
promotional options to the outcomes of internet auctions on the biggest Finnish auction 
website Huuto.net. This Master's thesis begins with a brief literature review of recent 
auction theory. The major topics, such as the revenue equivalence theorem and optimal 
auctions are discussed. The fundamentals of auction theory are shown mostly in a non-
technical fashion. The second section addresses bidding mechanism, signaling theory 
and reputation systems of eBay and Huuto.net. The "web behemoth" eBay offers 
tremendous opportunities to test empirically some of the theoretical findings of auction 
theory. Therefore, the third part of this thesis reviews the recent literature of seller's 
reputation and selected promotion methods and their impact on auction outcomes. On 
the basis of the recent empirical literature and auction theory as well, the hypotheses are 
set to be tested. 
 
The empirical section introduces the dataset and how it was obtained from Huuto.net. 
The final dataset consists of 227 closed auctions of iPhone 4S 16 GB mobile phones 
made by Apple. Striking distinctive features of the data include real time storage of 
sellers' feedback information and identification status. The statistical method used in 
this study is multiple linear regression analysis. Dependent variables are the ending 
price of a successful auction and the probability of sale for all auctions. The approval or 
rejecting of the presented hypotheses is based on the interpretation of the parameter 
estimate and its statistical significance for each explanatory variable in the statistical 
specifications. 
 
The statistical analysis reveals several variables that impact on the closing price at a 
significant level. First, increase in the amount of negative feedback points decreases 
closing price. This result is similar with several recent studies concerning seller 
reputation, and is not surprising. Gaining negative feedback certainly decreases buyers' 
trust towards the seller, which can be seen in the final price. Second, sellers who have 
acquired identification experience a massive increase in the closing price when 
compared to sellers with no identification. The effect is even stronger in the dataset 
where all sellers' feedback score was lower than one hundred points, which indicates 
that when the feedback score is lower, the acquired identification matters even more. 
Identifying oneself certainly pays off as it is entirely free of charge. Finnish buyers 
certainly show trust to sellers who have gone through the trouble of online bank 
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verification in order to gain the buyers' trust. Third, sellers with no established 
reputation experience a tremendous decline in the closing price. There are at least a 
couple explanations for this result. Buyers might not trust a seller with no established 
reputation hence the lower price. On the other hand, the inexperienced seller might have 
set the reserve price or BuyNow price too low, or maybe even closed the auction 
beforehand when she has seen a satisfactory bid. In the first scenario, it could be a good 
idea to build a reputation by acquiring a few feedback points as a buyer before rushing 
to sell the valuable iPhone for a tremendously low price. In the second scenario, it could 
be a good idea to learn the principals of selling on the internet by conducting a few 
trades. In any case, establishing a reputation of a few sales pays off. Finally, selling 
carrier locked or white iPhones resulted in declined final price for the seller. This is no 
surprise as the buyer may have to change her carrier and then, even if she did not have 
to change her carrier, stick with the carrier for 12-24 months or pay a fee to unlock the 
iPhone. 
 
The probability of sale was marginally affected by the increase of seller's total feedback 
score. One point increase in the score brought a nearly meaningless increase to the 
probability of sale. In the dataset where seller's feedback was lower than one hundred 
points, the identification brought a minor increase to the probability of sale. 
Promotional option background color also increased seller's possibilities to sell the 
iPhone. Surprisingly the use of bold and colorful font seemed to lower the probability of 
sale. These results might be biased because the amount of the auctions where a seller 
had chosen background color or bold and colorful font as promotional method was low. 
In general, display-enhancing upgrades did not convince the buyers of the quality of the 
product or seller's trustworthiness. The sellers of white or carrier locked iPhones 
experienced a decline in the probability of sale.  
 
In short, in the Finnish online auctions of iPhone 4S 16 GB mobile phones, establishing 
a reputation, avoiding negative feedback and acquiring identification pays off. The 
promotional options however are not worth the cost. 
 
As a proposal for future study, the impact of seller's total feedback score, positive, 
neutral and negative feedback points on the seller's growth rate (successfully closed 
auctions in a period of time) in a selected group of sellers could be determined 
empirically. Other intriguing research question for future study could be whether the 
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APPENDIX 1: A table summarizing the impact of a seller's reputation on closing price 
and probability of sale. 
 
Citation Item Item category 
Mean 
price Results 




$5 gold coin 
Homogeneous $33 
Positive feedback slightly 
increases closing price. 








willingness to pay, 












Used cars Heterogeneous $6360 
Higher reputation slightly 
increases closing price and 
probability. 






increases closing price. 
Negative feedback has no 
effect to closing price. 
Dewally & 
Ederington (2006) 
Comic books Heterogeneous $357 
A good percentage of 
positive feedback 
increases closing prices. 
Sellers with many 
feedbacks receive higher 
prices than sellers with 
few feedback ratings. 







increases closing price. 
Lucking-Reiley, 
Bryan, Prasad & 




Overall feedback points 
has no effect to closing 
price; negative feedback 








decreases the probability 





Heterogeneous 108 € 
higher reputation points 
decreases closing 
probability; has no effect 
on closing price 
62 
 
     
Citation Item Item category 
Mean 
price Results 





Heterogeneous  $41  
Higher reputation 
increases the probability of 
auction ending in a price 




iPhone 8 GB Homogeneous  $625  




(8 GB, 16 GB 
and 32 GB) 
Homogeneous  $270  
Percentage of negative 
feedback decreases closing 
price 
Shen, Chiou & 
Kuo (2011)  
Laptops Heterogeneous N/A 
Positive feedback slightly 
increases closing price. 
Impact of negative 
feedback is stronger. 





Homogeneous  $97  
Higher reputation 
increases probability of 






A small improvement in 
feedback points increased 
the closing probability and 
price; further increase had 
no effect. 





Increasing seller reputation 
has a small negative 
impact on closing 
probability; reputable 







Additional increase in 
seller reputation has no 
effect to closing price or 
probability; negative 
feedback reduces closing 
price. 
 
